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Abstract The paper aims at explaining the adoption of policy programs. We use the
garbage can model of organizational choice as our theoretical framework and complement
it with the institutional setting of administrative decision-making in order to understand the
complex causation of policy program adoption. Institutions distribute decision power by
rules and routines and coin actor identities and their interpretations of situations. We
therefore expect institutions to play a role when a policy window opens. We explore the
configurative explanations for program adoption in a systematic comparison of the
adoption of new alcohol policy programs in the Swiss cantons employing Qualitative
Comparative Analysis. The most important conditions are the organizational elements of
the administrative structure decisive for the coupling of the streams. The results imply that
classic bureaucratic structures are better suited to put policies into practice than limited
government.
Keywords Program adoption  Garbage can model  Crisp set qualitative comparative
analysis (csQCA)  Alcohol policy  Swiss cantons
The adoption of policy programs as research gap
This paper aims at explaining the adoption of policy programs. Policy programs have
become a major form of public intervention in the post war area. However, while there is a
vast interest in political science in both policy change (e.g., Hall 1993; Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith 1999) and policy instrument choice (e.g., Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998),
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comparatively little and rather scattered work has been done on the action level between
the two, that is, policy programs (e.g., Feiock and West 1993; Matishoff 2008). With the
present paper, we want to contribute to filling this research gap by taking the adoption of
alcohol policy programs in the Swiss cantons, that is, the middle federal rung in the Swiss
state structure, as an example.
In the following, we state three main arguments: first that the rather diffuse knowledge
on the causes of program adoption is due to the fact that it is an administrative rather than a
political decision whether to adopt a policy program or not; second that the garbage can
model of organizational choice makes an adequate theoretical framework for the expla-
nation of program adoption if complemented with institutionalist theory and that it is
particularly suited for the field of alcohol policy with its marked ambiguity due to its
different framings; and third that the approach of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
enables us to investigate the interaction between the streams of the garbage can model
thanks to its ability to deal with complex causation.
In the next section, we will conceptualize the phenomenon to be explained, namely the
adoption of alcohol policy programs. Subsequently, we will complement the garbage can
model with neo-institutionalism and derive nine conditions in order to explain the cantonal
diversity observed in alcohol prevention program adoption before we will briefly discuss
our research design and method, namely a crisp set qualitative comparative analysis
(csQCA). By taking advantage of two surveys of the relevant decision-making and
implementing bodies of Swiss alcohol policy at the subnational level, we are able to
compare alcohol program adoption in each canton between 1999 and 2004. We present
these data before turning to the results of the analysis in the subsequent part. The findings
will be discussed in light of our theory in the section that follows. The final section will
summarize the main findings and derive conclusions with regard to program adoption as
well as to theoretical implications.
The phenomenon to be explained: the adoption of new alcohol policy programs
A classic definition of policy programs is provided by Pressman and Wildavsky (1974:
xiv–xv) who distinguish program from policy as follows: ‘‘Let us agree to talk about policy
as a hypothesis containing initial conditions and predicted consequences. (…) A program
consists of governmental action initiated in order to secure objectives whose attainment is
problematical. A program exists when the initial conditions—the ‘if’ stage of the policy
hypothesis—have been met. The word ‘program’ signifies the conversion of a hypothesis
into governmental action. (…) Considered as a whole, a program can be conceived of as a
system in which each element is dependent on the other.’’ Hall (1993: 278) sees policy
change as the ‘‘deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to
past experience and new information.’’ While policy change thus involves modification of
the policy hypothesis including problem perception and the value-based choice of solu-
tions, the program decision is located at a subordinate level in that it regards the decision to
become operative in a coherent manner. A program consists of different policy instruments
the choice of which again is value-laden as argue Schneider and Ingram (1993). As a
consequence, we see the policy program adoption as a primarily executive-administrative
decision as opposed to policy change and instrument choice, which imply much more
political debate.
We investigate the causes for program adoption with the case of alcohol control policy
program adoption in the Swiss member-states. We do so for two main reasons: first, policy
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programs are an especially common form of intervention in the field of public health.
However, as stated above in general, also with regard to public health and alcohol policy in
particular, research so far was interested in policy change (Baumberg and Anderson 2008;
Ugland 2003) and instrument choice (Meier 1994; Sager 2009), but not in program
adoption. Second, Switzerland is highly federalistic and decentralized, with the main
competences for public policies held at the sub-national level of the cantons. Accordingly,
the field of alcohol prevention policy is regulated in a particularly inconsistent manner,
since the cantons are equipped with very extensive programming and implementation
competences, leading to a pronounced heterogeneity and variance in cantonal prevention
efforts (Sager 2007, 2009).
The time between 1999 and 2004 is considered an appropriate study period because in
1999, the Federal Commission for alcohol-related questions (an external expert commis-
sion consulting the Federal Government) started an initiative to promote cantonal alcohol
policy programs. Whereas the commission had drafted a National Alcohol Action Plan
consisting of a number of measures, there were no specific instruments promoted for the
cantonal level. The aim of this initiative was not to install a given set of policy measures,
but to launch a bottom-up process with cantons starting their own alcohol policy programs.
Thus, all 26 cantons have been exposed to the same vertical stimulus. However, the
decision to develop a program was left to the cantonal authorities as there was no coercive
power the commission could have exerted. Correspondingly, the ways in which the cantons
responded to this impulse vary greatly. While some cantons developed new programs from
the scratch, others did not even change their existing instruments. This extremely heter-
ogeneous pattern offers an outstanding opportunity for the comparative analysis of situa-
tional preconditions for program adoption.
The cantonal alcohol policies were assessed in case studies (Sager and Schla¨pfer 2004)
that show which cantons adopted new policy programs between 1999 and 2004 or looked
into the introduction of coherent, integrated overall alcohol policy programs. The outcome
‘‘program adoption’’ (PROGADOPT) is coded dichotomously (1 = change, 0 = no
change) as required for the method we use. In total, we find adoption of alcohol policy
programs in ten cantons, while sixteen cantons have not changed their activities in the
research period. The respective data on the cantons are presented in the last column in
Table 2.
In the next section, we present our theoretical framework based on the garbage can
model and neo-institutionalism from which conditions for our analysis will be derived.
The garbage can model and institutionalism: conditions for program adoption
For our analysis, we need a scheme that is adequate for both our subject ‘‘program
adoption’’ and our empirical test case ‘‘alcohol policy’’. We believe the garbage can model
of organizational choice (Cohen et al. 1972) to fit this shoe for two reasons: first, we
consider program adoption an administrative rather than a political decision, and accord-
ingly, we need an organizational theory of decision-making rather than a political theory.
Second, alcohol policy is a field of great ambiguity as it can be framed in different ways
from trade and EU integration policy to agricultural policy to health and social policy
(Ugland 2003). The garbage can model was developed to deal with decision-making
in situations with problematic preferences as can be constituted by competing frames.
Correspondingly, we consider the garbage can model a theoretical framework at the
adequate analytical level of organizations and matching the characteristics of our test case.
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The concept has made an impressive career in the study of decision-making not least
due to its adaption to public policy analysis by Kingdon (1984) and has not lost its
popularity to date (e.g., Nowak 2010). The main innovation of the model lies in its
‘‘attempt to push organizational decision theory into the previously uncharted territory of
‘organized anarchies’’’ (Padgett 1980: 583). Cohen et al. (1972) rejected a linear logic of
rational decision-making through a line of subsequent stages and proposed an alternative
view of a conjunction of different streams at a given time. As a consequence, ‘‘solutions
may be linked to problems more by chance than design’’ (Bendor et al. 2001: 188). There
are different applications of the garbage can model and the different streams are not
labelled consistently in these models. This variance of models is well in line with the
inventors’ spirit which ‘‘has always been to encourage colleagues to play with the basic
ideas, rather than defend them endlessly’’ (Olsen 2001: 192). In the following, we intend to
comply with Olsen’s invitation.
As Olsen (2001: 193) states, ‘‘the pure garbage can model is basically institution free, or
structure is treated as exogenous.’’ This lack of institutions in the model has been identified as
a problem by various critics. Padgett (1980: 583, also Bendor et al. 2001: 173) questions the
structural underpinning of the model: ‘‘Garbage can processes seem curiously divorced from
the familiar structural phenomena of organizational differentiation, centralization policy, and
standard operating procedures of traditional concern to classical organization theorists.’’ Two
arguments are put forward as to why institutions are a sensible amendment to the garbage can
model. First, Padgett (1980: 583) states that the ‘‘relative lack of emphasis on ‘the stable, the
routine, and the channeling effects that rules have on behavior’ (Perrow 1977) encourages the
misperception that the organized anachy paradigm can be usefully applied only to highly
decoupled and unorthodox organizational systems.’’ Second, Heimer and Stinchcombe
(1999: 26) argue ‘‘that the identities, histories, and institutional meanings of items in the
decision streams are central to the methodology and the empirical use of the garbage can
model.’’ While the first argument stems from classic organization theory, the second directly
relates to later works by March and Olsen (1984, 1989, Olsen 2006). In these writings, they
develop new institutionalism (NI) as ‘‘an attempt to supplement ideas of consequential action,
exogenous preferences, garbage cans, and inefficient histories … NI also represents a shift in
focus from the logic of consequences … to alternative forms of intelligence and behavioral
logics. In particular, it explores a logic of appropriateness based on a sense of identity (March
and Olsen 1989, 23).… Actors behave in accordance with their interpretation of rules and
practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated, and accepted’’ (Olsen
2001: 193). Particularly because we are interested in decision within public administration as
the ‘‘preeminent institutional form in modern society’’ (Zucker 1983: 1), we share this view
and therefore adopt a neo-institutionalist stance in our analysis.
As for both the policy stream and the policy window, we consider them stable in our test
case. Kingdon (1984: 173) uses the term policy window for the momentary ‘‘opportunity
for advocates of proposals to push their pet solution, or to push attention to their special
problems.’’ The Federal Commission’s initiative to promote cantonal alcohol policy pro-
grams can be understood as such an opportunity for cantonal actors that was open during
the time span under study. Likewise, the commission’s proposal of a ‘‘National Alcohol
Action Plan’’ is considered here as the policy solution looking for a problem. We thus face
a common vertical stimulus from the federal level in all cantons, but program adoption
only takes place in half of them. We assume that this is due to the specific settings of
politics, problems and structure the vertical stimulus found in the cantons. Correspond-
ingly, we consider the streams of politics and problems and complement them with their
institutional setting.
4 Policy Sci (2013) 46:1–21
123
As Varone et al. (2006), we will not focus on singular explanations, but on the settings
of conditions for program adoption. We therefore use the theory to identify relevant
conditions. What we are interested in is how these conditions interact in constellations.
Based on theoretical positions put forward in comparative research on alcohol policy
(Meier 1994; Sager 2007, 2009), we will identify nine situational conditions expected to
make a difference to policy program adoption.
Political stream: conditions at the politics level
We consider two conditions at the politics level relevant for policy program adoption:
First condition: Party political staffing of the key department for alcohol policy
According to Meier (1994: 179–180), the strength of the major party makes a significant
difference in alcohol policy. The ‘‘partisan theory’’ (Hibbs 1977) attributes particular
importance to the party-political composition of parliament and government when
explaining differing political results. Comparative welfare state research emphasizes the
importance of a strong left-wing, which also has an effect in health policy. With their
support for a strong (social) state, the political left also has a more positive stance with
regard to active health-oriented alcohol policy than do liberal forces. It follows that the
greater the influence of the political left-wing on the health policy of a canton is, the more
favorable are the conditions for alcohol policy program adoption. The party-political
staffing of the key department for alcohol policy can be expected to be decisive in this.
Second condition: veto players and promotors
The veto players theory put forward by Tsebelis (2002) assumes that with an increasing
number of institutions necessary for a political decision (‘‘veto points’’), the decision-
makers’ room for maneuver decreases and the chances for implementing political reforms
dwindle. Direct democracy instruments have influenced federal and cantonal decision-
making processes in Switzerland by acting as veto points. They led either to veto players’
positions being anticipated or to the actors being involved in the decision-making process
at an early stage and with strong veto powers. It is difficult to implement an active health-
oriented alcohol policy, which intends to move away from the status quo by means of
coherent overall programs, if powerful actors threaten to exercise their veto or such threat
is to be expected on the basis of past experience. The economic importance of the alcohol
industry can thus limit the scope of cantonal alcohol policy by acting as a veto player.
While Tsebelis’ (2002) veto points are an institutionalist concept, we consider veto players
as part of the politics stream. The main reason is that we focus on the political strength of
actors in terms of power resources rather than on the formal veto points which in the case
of direct democracy are the same for all actors in a jurisdiction. The second reason lies with
Kingdon’s (1984: 188) concept of political entrepreneurs whom he describes ‘‘as advocates
who are willing to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, money—to promote a
position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary
benefits. … The entrepreneurs are found in many locations. No single formal position or
even informal place in the political system has a monopoly for them.’’ Kingdon (1984)
considers the policy entrepreneurs crucial for the coupling of streams when a policy
window opens. In the empirical context of our study, however, we could not find evidence
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for such a decisive role of single actors. Rather, we found promoters of active alcohol
policy that played a role which can be described as the counterpart to veto players: whereas
the latter use their resources to hamper active alcohol programs, the former employ the
same strategies to advance them. Correspondingly, we decided to take the two sides of
policy advocacy together with the condition PROMVETO operationalized as the presence
of strong promoters AND weak or no veto players.
Problem stream
The handling of societal problems in the garbage can model diametrically contradicts the
rational logic of socio-economic theories seeing state functions as a reaction to social and
economic developments and the functional problems of state polities stemming from these.
As opposed to this view, the garbage can model claims that ‘‘people do not set about to
solve problems here. More often solutions search for problems. People work on problems
only when a particular combination of problem, solutions, and participants in a choice
situation makes it possible’’ (Kingdon 1984: 91). A systematic link between problem
situation and alcohol program adoption would question the assumption of independent
streams. As our test case regards preventive alcohol policy, we refer to comparative health
policy analysis focusing on the prevalence of the problem at issue (Vatter and Ru¨efli 2003).
Third condition: alcohol consumption
The problems addressed by alcohol programs are not alcohol consumption as such but its
consequences, that is, alcohol-related social harm such as violence or estrepement and the
burden of disease caused by riskful drinking. While there are epistemological statistics on
these problems, these data do not cover the Swiss cantons. Official health statistics for the
cantons address drinking behavior only in a very general manner, for example, per capita
consumption of alcohol. We decide to take the proportion of people per canton who
consume alcohol more than once a day as best indicator at hand for alcohol-related
problems. In Rehm et al.’s (1999: 219) comparison of three methods for assessing alcohol
consumption, the graduated frequency measure to which our indicator corresponds con-
sistently yielded higher estimates of the prevalences of high risk drinking and harm. As for
social costs, Jeanrenaud (2003) estimates a total amount of 6.7 billion Swiss franks per
year, that is, 1,000 franks per capita due to alcohol abuse. As for the burden of disease,
Rehm et al. (2003: 1209) find the average volume of alcohol consumption ‘‘to increase risk
for the following major chronic diseases: mouth and oropharyngeal cancer; oesophageal
cancer; liver cancer; breast cancer; unipolar major depression; epilepsy; alcohol use dis-
orders; hypertensive disease; hemorrhagic stroke; and cirrhosis of the liver.’’ Hence, while
we do not expect program adoption in a canton to be justified with the respective pro-
portion of people who consume alcohol more than once a day, we argue that the variable
can serve as a valid proxy for the alcohol-related problems such programs address.
Institutional setting: conditions at the level of organizational structure
As developed above, we argue that the coupling of streams may depend on institutions.
Institutions distribute decision power by rules and routines and coin actor identities and
their interpretations of situations. We therefore expect institutions to play a decisive role
when a policy window opens. In our analysis of the institutional setting, we follow Lodge
6 Policy Sci (2013) 46:1–21
123
(2003: 163, also Olsen 2006): ‘‘One of the basic tenets of the statist and historical insti-
tutional literature has been its emphasis on the internal organization of the state, particu-
larly the political-administrative nexus. Administrative capacities are said to influence the
scope of ‘bounded innovation’ in policy reform.’’ We consider the following six organi-
zational structural characteristics:
Fourth condition: degree of centralization
Centralization, taken as ‘‘the degree to which power and control in a system are concen-
trated in the hands of relatively few individuals’’ (Rogers 1995: 380), basically considers
the actual inner organization of the relevant bureaucratic bodies. Whereas in some cantons,
alcohol prevention is concentrated in one unit, others entertain operative satellites or split
prevention tasks among various administrative units. Program adoption can be expected if
the alcohol policy administrative structures are centralized as the room for maneuver is
larger and it will be easier to develop coherent action (Sager 2007).
Fifth condition: degree of outsourcing of tasks
Centralization in the above definition also regards the degree to which tasks are out-
sourced to non-public actors. The outsourcing of tasks leads to the fragmentation of
responsibility for a policy and therefore can be expected to hinder the development of
coherent and encompassing policy programs. As Cattacin and Lucas (1999) have shown,
alcohol policy in Switzerland is particularly marked by non-state actors. We expect the
adoption of a cantonal alcohol policy program if the bulk of the tasks are not out-
sourced to third parties.
Sixth condition: professional specialization
A further issue is whether policy-making is strongly influenced by the degree of pro-
fessional specialization and differentiation in the responsible administrative bodies
(Sager 2007). Professionalism describes the degree ‘‘to which an organization’s mem-
bers possess a relatively high level of knowledge and expertise, usually measured by the
member’s range of occupational specialties and their degree of professionalism
expressed by formal training’’ (Rogers 1995: 380). Correspondingly, we expect program
adoption if there is a professionally staffed administrative body specially entrusted with
the policy.
Seventh condition: coordination
From an organizational perspective, we must also consider the management of the
actual policy formulation and implementation processes. O’Toole and Meier (1999)
show managerial activities to be substantive contributors to organizational success. In
this respect, there are two strategies expected to have an impact on alcohol policy
design decisions (Sager 2003), namely coordination and cooperation. Firstly, the coor-
dination among the agencies concerned within a cantonal public administration fosters
mutual learning and can thus contribute to innovation (Sager 2005). Consequently,
program adoption can be expected in cantons with a high level of inner administrative
coordination.
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Eighth condition: number of departments involved
Coordination also is a matter of the number of agents who coordinate. A high number of
relevant agents leads to fragmentation of responsibility and complicates coordination
(Kaufmann and Sager 2006). This effect can be expected to be even stronger if the
respective units are equipped with decision power as it is the case for executive depart-
ments (Sager 2009). Fragmentation thus differs from inner administrative centralization in
that it regards the level of political departments under the control of the respective
members of the cantonal executive. This adds executive politics as well as differing policy
cultures to the analysis. Heads of departments may disagree on policy for ideological
reasons and so may departmental units for epistemological reasons. For example, the
transportation department may have different priorities than the health services, and police
may disagree with the social services. For both reasons, we expect fragmentation to hinder
program adoption. We therefore include the number of involved executive departments as
eighth condition in our analysis.
Ninth condition: vertical and horizontal cooperation
As said above, we also expect cooperation to foster program adoption. On the one hand,
horizontal inter-cantonal cooperation can lead to learning processes resulting in the
adoption of policy programs that have been successful in other cantons. Policy diffusion
primarily facilitates innovation. On the other hand, there are also vertical contacts between
cantonal and federal authorities. As cantonal administrations often lack the knowledge and
expertise necessary for evidence-based policy making, we can also expect strong vertical
cooperation to lead to innovation (Sager 2003, 2009). We capture the willingness to
cooperate with the variable ‘‘Cooperation’’ which encompasses the two forms of
cooperation.
In the garbage can model, it is assumed that the random intersection of the independent
streams generates decisions. However, the model does not provide assumptions as to how
the streams interact (Zahariadis 2007: 84) which is why we do not formulate configurative
hypotheses. Still, we aim to shed light on this interaction, which has methodological
consequences as complex causation is implied. We consider the approach of Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA), the most appropriate way to tackle this problem. QCA
denotes a family of logical methods of case comparison that focus on constellations of
factors instead of examining each variable independently (Schneider and Wagemann
2012). Causal complexity is fundamental to QCA: ‘‘What makes a certain feature (…)
causally relevant in one setting and not in another is the fact that its causal significance is
altered by the presence of other features (that is, its effect is altered by context). Similarly,
apparently different features can have the same effect depending on which other features
they are associated with. (…) This is a primary justification for examining cases as wholes
and for trying to decipher how different causal factors fit together’’ (Ragin 1987: 49). The
research design is presented in the next section.
Research design and data
Our approach is a systematic comparison of cantonal decision-making and implementation
structures in the field of alcohol control policy. Switzerland represents an ideal field of
investigation for systematic-comparative enquiries into the conditions for the emergence
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and means of functioning of different forms of authority and administrative organization
due to its 26 relatively autonomous cantons, which also vary greatly in terms of their
contextual features and internal administrative organization. A further advantage of such a
cross-sectional analysis is the fact that the superordinate context in terms of the political
system of the federal state remains constant for all the objects of enquiry, that is, the
cantons. The Swiss cantons are fully-fledged political systems within the common insti-
tutional framework of the Swiss nation state.
To address our subject under exploration, we relied upon survey research to generate a
comprehensive picture of cantonal alcohol policy activities. Empirically, thus, the paper
draws from two large surveys of the Swiss cantons conducted in 1999 and 2004. While the
first survey in 1999 was financed as basic research, the second in 2004 was commissioned
by two alcohol policy-related federal agencies with a view to developing a federal alcohol
policy. In the first empirical investigation in 1999 (Sager and Vatter 2000), a standardized
questionnaire was used to ask the relevant decision-making and implementation bodies in
the Swiss cantons for information regarding the contents and organization of alcohol
prevention and control policy. In the second survey in 2004 (Sager and Schla¨pfer 2004),
personal interviews with cantonal stakeholders and decision-makers were used to obtain
information. The questions were the same as in the first survey, so the information gathered
consisted of a dataset comparable to the first one. In addition to the original data collected
via surveys, the findings have been supplemented by comprehensive case reviews. The
personal interviews were accompanied by extensive document analyses of both public and
non-governmental records in order to permit reliable case studies to be made for each
canton. Table 1 offers an overview over the condition and outcome variables and the way
we dichotomized them.
The dichotomization of the variables is due to our choice of method and for most
variables based on the obvious presence or absence of a condition. In three cases, we had to
set a cutoff point in a continuum: as for the problem condition, it corresponds to a natural
break in the data, and as for outsourcing and involved departments, it is based on substantive
case knowledge as proposed by Yamasaki and Rihoux (2009: 130). The respective infor-
mation is presented in Table 1. Table 2 displays the resulting truth table for our analysis.
Program adoption has been observed in ten cantons. As for the derived antecedents, we
encounter very heterogeneous patterns. In six cantons, the key department is held by the
left-wing party. Only in four cantons, we encounter both strong promoters of a health-
oriented alcohol policy and weak veto players, while in twelve cantons, the problem
pressure is given according to our definition. The majority of the cantons has decentralized
structures (n = 17) and outsources most of the alcohol policy tasks (n = 17). These two
groups of 17 cantons are not identical, though. Specialization is high in eleven cantons.
Close coordination within the administration takes place in only six cantons; and in 16
cantons, three or more departments are involved in alcohol policy. Eight cantons display a
cooperative strategy in both formulation and implementation of their alcohol policy. Apart
from four cases, each case displays a unique configuration. The two cantons of Solothurn
and Schaffhausen display the same configuration with the same outcome, while the two
cantons of Lucerne and Glarus are contradictory cases, that is, they converge with the
conditions, but differ in the outcome.1
1 For the analysis, we assigned the contradictory combination to outcome 0 as that was theoretically more
plausible (Yamasaki and Rihoux 2009: 132–135), i.e. we included Glarus and excluded Lucerne in the
analysis. Before doing so, we aimed to find ways to lift these contradictions by going back to the cases. Due
to the limited information, however, this strategy was not successful.
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For the empirical analysis, we employ a csQCA as developed by Ragin (1987). The
method is based on Boolean algebra, that is, the logic of the binary system with the two
logical operators ‘‘or’’ and ‘‘and’’. csQCA displays the coded cases in ‘‘truth tables’’ and
converts the different constellations into formulae, which can then be minimized to the
most parsimonious explanation of an outcome. The following notation is used in these
formulae: ‘‘?’’ represents the logic operator ‘‘or’’, ‘‘*’’ the logic operator ‘‘and’’, upper
case letters are used when a variable takes on the value 1, and lower case letters are used
for 0. The basic idea is that if an outcome D is found in a case displaying A, B, and C as
well as in another case displaying A and C, but not B, it obviously does not make a
difference for the occurrence of D whether B is present or not. The respective formula is:
A*B*C?A*b*C ? D which accordingly can be minimized to A*C ? D. One case can
display different constellations of conditions, which are all treated as equally important. It
is such different constellations of conditions, that is, the causal complexity behind a given
phenomenon, that are at the core interest in csQCA. The notion of multiple conjunctural
causation is crucial in this respect. ‘‘[M]ultiple conjunctural causation contains the notion
of equifinality, which simply means that different paths can lead to the same outcome’’
(Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009: 8). Complex causality includes also the notion of asymmetric
causal relationships, that is, if the presence of a feature can explain an outcome, its absence
does not necessarily imply the opposite outcome. Accordingly, we will analyze both
occurrence and non-occurrence of program adoption.
We used the Tosmana (Version 1.3.2)-software for our calculations (based on the
Quine-McCluskey-minimization-algorithm) in which we included logical remainders, that
is, the respective computer-generated simplifying assumptions were allowed. With 9
conditions, there are 29, that is, 512 theoretically possible combinations. We therefore have
a ‘‘limited diversity’’-problem with only 26 cases. However, we use QCA not to test
theory, but to develop new theoretical arguments. Berg-Schlosser et al. (2009: 16) state,
‘‘QCA does not yield new theories. What it may do, once performed, is to help the
researcher generate some new insights, which may then be taken as a basis for a further
theoretical development or for reexamination of existing theories.’’ This is the aim of our
paper and the inclusion of logical remainders supports this objective. In order to avoid
contradictory simplifying assumptions (CSAs) in our remainders, we closely followed
Yamasaki and Rihoux (2009: 136–137). We detected five CSAs with the intersection
function with the Tosmana software, assigned each with a theoretically plausible outcome
value and integrated them as additional cases in the truth table before running Tosmana.
The addition of these five cases has not generated any other CSAs.
Results
The coded cases presented in table 2 form the basis for csQCA. In the following, these data
are translated into multiplicative and additive formulae. We use the same notation as in the
example presented above. In the following, we will explain both the presence and the
absence of policy change. csQCA yields the following solutions for the two situations.
Conditional settings for the program adoption
When including all nine conditions (LEFTDEP ? PROMVETO ? PROBLEM ? DE-
CENTR ? OUTSOU ? SPECIAL ? COORD ? DEPINV ? COOP), csQCA identifies
five combinations of conditions which favor alcohol policy program adoption.
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PROGADOPT: Program adoption is encountered in cantons Cases
decentral*outsourc with a centralized responsibility for alcohol
policy within the administration and where
alcohol policy tasks are not outsourced
Appenzell
Outerrhodes
and Zug
? or
outsourc*COOP where alcohol policy tasks are not outsourced
and which are open to horizontal and vertical
cooperation
Basel City and
Geneva
? or
decentral*PROMVETO with a centralized responsibility for alcohol
policy within the administration and with
strong promoters of health-oriented alcohol
policy as well as weak veto players
Bern
? or
decentral*PROBLEM with a centralized responsibility for alcohol
policy within the administration and with
problem pressure
Jura and
Valais
? or
DECENTRAL*COORD*DEPINV*coop with decentralized responsibilities for alcohol
policy within the administration and with a
high level of inner-administrative
coordination and more than three
departments involved and which are not
open to horizontal and vertical cooperation
Vaud and
Zurich
The five solutions can be divided into three groups of cantons displaying complementary or
even contradictory settings that both foster program adoption.
The first group encompassing the first two solutions contains cantons in which policy
responsibilities are centralized and the respective tasks and services are provided and
produced by the respective public authorities. Together with the willingness to cooperate
with other cantons and the federal level, the various constellations of these three idio-
syncrasies as we can find them in the cantons of Appenzell Outerrhodes, Basel City,
Geneva and Zug provide a favorable setting for program adoption. We label this group the
‘‘cooperative bureaucracy’’ as the two features of centralization and direct provision of
public goods are characteristics of the classic administrative model coupled with the will to
cooperate.
The second group contains the two combinations with a centralized administration and
either strong vested interests in favor of alcohol control or high alcohol consumption. This
coupling of centralization with either the politics stream or the problem stream is found in
Bern, Jura, and Valais. We call this group ‘‘pressure or problem’’.
The third group, then, comprises the two cantons of Zurich and Vaud where we find a
completely different constellation of conditions fostering program adoption. Unlike in the
other two groups, this constellation combines decentralized structures with many depart-
ments involved coupled with a strong inner administrative coordination, but reluctant to
cooperate with other cantons or the central state. Whereas in the first group, consolidated
and cooperative structures endorse program adoption, we encounter here quite the oppo-
site, namely fragmented structures and reluctance to cooperate coupled with strong
coordination. We label this solution ‘‘fragmented autarchy’’. Apparently, program adoption
in these cantons is advanced due to their domestic focus and decision-making takes place
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among the various agencies and not due to external exchange. This may be due to the fact
that the two cantons in this group are very large and active and also have strong urban
centers.
Conditional settings for non-adoption of policy programs
In order to analyze the absence of program adoption, we again include all nine conditions
(LEFTDEP ? PROMVETO ? PROBLEM ? DECENTR ? OUTSOU ? SPE-
CIAL ? COORD ? DEPINV ? COOP). csQCA identifies three combinations of condi-
tions which this time hinder alcohol policy program adoption.
progadopt: Program adoption is not
encountered in cantons
Cases
promveto*problem*OUTSOURC with weak promoters of health-
oriented alcohol policy as well as
strong veto players and with little
problem pressure in which alcohol
policy tasks are mostly
outsourced.
Appenzell Innerrhodes,
Argovia, Glarus, Saint
Gall, Schwyz and Uri
? or
DECENTRAL*coord*coop with decentralized responsibilities
for alcohol policy and with a low
level of inner-administrative
coordination and which are not
open to horizontal and vertical
cooperation
Fribourg, Grisons, Glarus,
Obwald, Nidwald,
Schaffhausen, Solothurn,
and Thurgovia
? or
DECENTRAL*OUTSOURC*COOP with decentralized responsibilities
for alcohol policy and in which
alcohol policy tasks are mostly
outsourced and which are open to
horizontal and vertical
cooperation
Basel Land, Neuchaˆtel and
Ticino
We can group these combinations of conditions in two more general situational settings,
namely one politically marked constellation and one organizational setting both of which
do not lead to program adoption.
The first group encompasses the first solution where both the politics stream and the
problem stream play a role. These cantons display a political setting hindering program
adoption as we find a lack of societal promoters for health-oriented alcohol policy as well
as strong veto players in this second solution. This condition is combined with little
problem pressure regarding alcohol consumption and an administrative organization that
does not produce the respective services itself but outsources the respective tasks. In this
constellation found in the cantons of Appenzell Innerrhodes, Argovia, Glarus, Saint Gall,
Schwyz and Uri, there is neither a problem stream in form of an obvious need nor political
will for further activities against harmful alcohol consumption. Correspondingly, we label
these cantons as the ‘‘neither need nor will’’ group.
The second group comprises the last two constellations in which we find merely
organizational conditions in combinations that to a certain degree are opposed to the first
group of constellations displaying program adoption. The common feature of the two
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constellations is the decentralized structures in charge which seem to prevent alcohol
policy program adoption in two situations, namely first in combination with both no
coordination and no will to cooperate externally as in Fribourg, Grisons, Glarus, Obwald,
Nidwald, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, and Thurgovia, and second, in combination with both
outsourcing and cooperation as in Basel Land, Ticino, and Neuchaˆtel. Apparently,
decentralization prevents program adoption in both externally oriented and domestically
oriented settings. Consequently, we label this group the ‘‘decentralized setting’’.
Sorting through the garbage can
Our comparative study leads to a number of insights of both theoretical and substantive
nature. First, the theoretical argument that the garbage can model profits from the inclusion
of institutional factors in order to fully reflect organizational reality finds clear support in
our study. Given that both solution stream and policy window were stable, the csQCA
yields five combinations that lead to program adoption three of which consist only of
characteristics of the organizational structure. Likewise, two of the three combinations of
factors that did not lead to program adoption also only include organizational factors. In
contrast, the presence or absence of policy entrepreneurs only played a role in one term of
each respective solution. The inclusion of institutional elements thus helped us to shed
light on the question of ‘‘why some decisions tend to become garbage cans and others do
not’’ (Zahariadis 2007: 84). This finding is a strong argument for a more institutionalistic
approach in garbage can applications that may rely on the neo-institutionalist writings of
two of the inventors of the garbage can model (March and Olsen 1984, 1989).
Second, the study supports the contention of independent streams. Especially, the
garbage can feature that the problem stream can be regarded as independent from the
solution stream has led to irritation by critics (Bendor et al. 2001: 172). Cohen et al. (1972:
16) state: ‘‘Although decision-making is thought of as a process for solving problems that
is often not what happens. Problems are worked upon in the context of some choice, but
choices are made only when the shifting combinations of problems, solutions, and deci-
sion-makers happen to make action possible.’’ Our study supports this assertion. In fact,
only in one of the different configurations of conditions for program adoption does the
problem stream pop up. And again, only in one constellation that did not lead to program
adoption does the absence of problem pressure play a role. In both solutions, the effect was
in the direction we expected based on theory. In most our cases, however, solutions are in
fact decided without linear recurrence to problems.
Third, the politics stream in our study matters both in a combination fostering and in one
preventing alcohol program adoption. In both constellations, however, it is the vested
interests and not party politics that play a role. Based on our cases, this result is due to the
contacts between health organizations and the responsible administration within epistemic
policy communities. These contacts are closer than the ones between the administration
and party politics. This is in line with our understanding of policy programs as the concrete
operationalization of an existing policy in order to implement it (Pressman and Wildavsky
1974). Consequently, a policy program necessarily is in line with the policy it stems from.
Otherwise, the definition would not make sense. While the policy is decided by party
politics in legislature and executive, however, organized interests in favor of active health
policy may well take actions to get the administrative actors in gear to set up a concrete
policy program. As for non adoption, it makes sense for political opponents of the policy in
place to impede program adoption to prevent the policy from being implemented. The
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political logic of program adoption thus differs from the ones of policy change and
instrument choice as it is vested interests rather than party politics that are important and
the concern is not the policy as such but primarily its implementation.
Finally, while the study provided different and partly inconsistent explanations of
program adoption, it gives various hints that alcohol program adoption is more likely to
take place in classic bureaucratic structures than in decentralized and limited government
structures. On the one hand side, we found program adoption in either cooperative
bureaucracy where tasks were not outsourced, in centralized structures coupled with the
politics or the problem stream, or in well coordinated autarchic administrations. All of
these settings display features of the classic bureaucratic model (Goodsell 1994; Olsen
2001). On the other hand side, program adoption did not take place in cantons that out-
source their alcohol policy tasks or are organized in a decentralized manner or both. While
the actual solutions of course are more complex than this, the overall picture implies that
classic bureaucratic structures are better suited to put policies into practice than limited
government.
In sum, our findings make a strong argument for Padgett’s (1980: 583–584) point that
the organized anarchy paradigm can be usefully applied to ‘‘fairly traditional and
bureaucratic structure.’’ What is more, we have shown that garbage can decision-making
can be better explained and understood when its institutional setting is taken into account.
Conclusion
In this study, we have investigated the causes for policy program adoption. Policy pro-
grams are operationalizations of policies and program adoption unlike policy change or
policy instrument choice therefore can be understood as administrative decisions rather
than political ones. We complemented the garbage can model of organizational choice with
institutional elements of organizational structure. This has proved to be an appropriate
scheme to understand the causes for program adoption. In the systematic comparison of
alcohol policy program adoption in the Swiss cantons employing csQCA, we identify
different combinations of factors that encouraged program adoption in ten cantons and
another set of different conjunctions of features that prevented program adoption in sixteen
cantons. As for the cantons that adopted new policy programs, we have grouped the five
identified constellations in three sets of cantons which we label as ‘‘cooperative bureau-
cracy’’, ‘‘pressure or problem’’, and ‘‘fragmented autarchy’’ according to the common
distinctive features of these groups. As for the absence of program adoption, the three
combinations of conditions can be grouped in two sets we label as ‘‘neither need nor will’’
and ‘‘decentralized setting’’. The labels make it clear that both adoption and non-adoption
of policy programs take place in very different settings. The analysis provides a realistic
image of the polymorphic and complex realities of policy dynamics as it shows that the
cantonal decision to adopt health-oriented alcohol policy programs cannot be explained
monocausally. Additionally, our study confirms the assumption of asymmetric causality in
that the absence of factors explaining program adoption does not equal non-occurrence of
program adoption. With recourse to theory, the configurative approach helped to shed light
on the question of when various streams meet and lead to decisions. The structural factors
of administrative organization turn out to be decisive in this respect. A more institution-
alistic form of the garbage can model is thus in order.
The present study has its limitations which is why further lines of research ought to be
discussed here. As for one, our study is limited to a single policy. This makes sense in
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terms of a controlled comparative research design. However, further research may profit
from cross-sectoral comparisons in order to find policy-specific patterns of program
adoption. Second, the two contradicting cases in our sample point to insufficient theoretical
modelling and qualitative further investigation will help to find relevant causes missing in
this study. Such research may sensibly investigate into the process aspect of garbage can
decisions and their historical background as proposed by Heimer and Stinchcombe (1999).
Finally, our study reveals classic bureaucratic structures to be more apt for turning policies
into programs than limited government structures. This finding fully concurs with Olsen’s
(2006: 2) cue ‘‘that for those interested in how contemporary public administration is
organized, functions, and changes, it is worthwhile to reconsider and rediscover bureau-
cracy as an administrative form, an analytical concept and a set of ideas and observation
about public administration and formally organized institutions.’’ The finding also has a
strong normative aspect. Both Padgett (1980) and Hood (1999) stress the prescriptive side
of the garbage can model. ‘‘In a world of corporate mission statements full of business-
school cliche´s about coherent strategy and tight-ship processing, the model stresses the
inescapable role of happenstance, x-factors and chance connections in complex institu-
tions’’ (Hood 1999: 60). Whereas Padgett (1980) finds that in hierarchical settings, heads of
hierarchies should delegate decisions to lower levels rather than engage in active tactical
maneuvering, our results are more diverse due to the different organizational settings we
found and which are not always hierarchical. Further research may work on the managerial
implications of the model in different institutional settings. As indicated by Padgett (1980:
584), ‘‘given unorthodox theories, it is perhaps not surprising that resultant managerial
recommendations are similarly unorthodox.’’ Further study thus might lead to public
management prescriptions based less on textbook recipes and more appropriate for a
complex organizational reality within the boundaries of bureaucratic structures.
References
Baumberg, B., & Anderson, P. (2008). Health, alcohol and EU law: Understanding the impact of European
single market law on alcohol policies. European Journal of Public Health, 18(4), 392–398.
Bemelmans-Videc, M.-L., Rist, R. C., & Vedung, E. (Eds.). (1998). Carrots, sticks, and sermons: Policy
instruments and their evaluation. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Bendor, J., Moe, T. M., & Shotts, K. W. (2001). Recycling the garbage can: An assessment of the research
program. American Political Science Review, 95, 169–190.
Berg-Schlosser, D., De Meur, G., Rihoux, B., & Ragin, C. (2009). Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)
as an approach. In B. Rihoux & C. Ragin (Eds.), Configurational comparative methods. Qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques (pp. 1–18). London: Sage.
Cattacin, S., & Lucas, B. (1999). Autore´gulation, intervention e´tatique, mise en re´seau: Les transformations
de l’E´tat social en Europe (les cas du VIH/sida, de l’abus d’alcool et des drogues ille´gales). Revue
franc¸aise de science politique, 49, 379–398.
Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A garbage can model of organizational choice.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 1–25.
Feiock, R. C., & West, J. P. (1993). Testing competing explanations for policy adoption: Municipal solid
waste recycling programs. Political Research Quarterly, 46, 399–419.
Goodsell, C. T. (1994). The case for bureaucracy. A public administration polemic. Chatham, NJ: Chatham
House Publishers.
Hall, P. A. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic policymaking in
Britain. Comparative Politics, 25, 275–296.
Heimer, C. A., & Stinchcombe, A. L. (1999). Remodeling the garbage can: Implications of the origins of
items in decision streams. In M. Egeberg & P. Laegreid (Eds.), Organizing Political Institutions.
Essays for Johan P. Olsen (pp. 25–57). Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
Policy Sci (2013) 46:1–21 19
123
Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review, 71,
1467–1487.
Hood, C. (1999). The garbage can model of organization: Describing a condition or a prescriptive design
principle? In M. Egeberg & P. Laegreid (Eds.), Organizing Political Institutions. Essays for Johan
P. Olsen (pp. 59–78). Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
Jeanrenaud, C. (2003). Die sozialen Kosten des Alkoholmissbrauchs in der Schweiz. Neuenburg: Institut de
recherches e´conomiques et re´gionales (IRER).
Kaufmann, V., & Sager, F. (2006). The coordination of local policies for urban development and public
transportation in four Swiss cities. Journal of Urban Affairs, 28, 353–374.
Kingdon, J. W. (1984). Agendas, alternatives and public policy. New York: Harper Collins.
Lodge, M. (2003). Institutional choice and policy transfer: Reforming British and German Railway regu-
lation. Governance, 16, 159–178.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life.
American Political Science Review, 73, 734–749.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics.
New York: Free Press.
Matishoff, D. C. (2008). The adoption of state climate change policies and renewable portfolio standards:
Regional diffusion or internal determinants. Review of Policy Research, 25, 527–546.
Meier, K. J. (1994). The politics of sin. Drugs, alcohol, and public policy. Armonk/London: M.E.Sharpe.
Nowak, T. (2010). Of garbage cans and rulings: Judgments of the European court of justice in the EU
legislative process. West European Politics, 33, 753–769.
O’Toole, L. J., Jr, & Meier, K. J. (1999). Modelling the impact of public management: Implications of
structural context. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 9, 505–526.
Olsen, J. P. (2001). Garbage cans, new institutionalism, and the study of politics. American Political Science
Review, 95, 191–198.
Olsen, J. P. (2006). Maybe it is time to rediscover bureaucracy. Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory, 16(1), 1–24.
Padgett, J. F. (1980). Managing garbage can hierarchies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25, 583–604.
Perrow, C. (1977). Review of ambiguity and choice in organizations. Contemporary Sociology, 6, 294–298.
Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. B. (1974). Implementation. How great Expectations in Washington are
dashed in Oakland. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ragin, C. (1987). The comparative method. Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rehm, J., et al. (1999). Assessment methods for alcohol consumption, prevalence of high risk drinking and
harm: A sensitivity analysis. International Journal of Epidemiology, 28, 219–224.
Rehm, J., et al. (2003). The relationship of average volume of alcohol consumption and patterns of drinking
to burden of disease: An overview. Addiction, 98(9), 1209–1228.
Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of innovations. New York: The Free Press.
Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (1999). The advocacy coalition framework: An assessment. In
P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process (pp. 117–168). Westview: Boulder.
Sager, F. (2003). Kompensationsmo¨glichkeiten fo¨deraler Vollzugsdefizite. Das Beispiel der kantonalen
Alkoholpra¨ventionspolitiken. Swiss Political Science Review, 9, 309–333.
Sager, F. (2005). Metropolitan institutions and policy coordination: The integration of land use and transport
policies in Swiss urban areas. Governance, 18(2), 227–256.
Sager, F. (2007). Habermas’ models of decisionism, technocracy, and pragmatism in times of governance.
Public Administration, 85, 429–447.
Sager, F. (2009). Governance and coercion. Political Studies, 57, 537–558.
Sager, F., & Schla¨pfer, M. (2004). Alkoholpolitische Kantonsprofile. Bern: Study for the Swiss Alcohol
Board and the Federal Office of Public Health.
Sager, F., & Vatter, A. (2000). Strukturen und Strategien der Kantone in der Alkoholpra¨ventionspolitik.
Bern: Study for the Swiss Foundation for Alcohol Research.
Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction of target populations: Implications for politics and
policy. American Political Science Review, 87(2), 334–347.
Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2012). Set-theoretic methods for the social sciences. A guide to
qualitative comparative analysis. Cambridge: CUP.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ugland, T. (2003). Adaptation and integration through policy re-categorization. Journal of Public Policy,
23(2), 157–170.
Varone, F., Rothmayr, C., & Montpetit, E. (2006). Regulating biomedicine in Europe and North America:
A qualitative comparative analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 45, 317–343.
20 Policy Sci (2013) 46:1–21
123
Vatter, A., & Ru¨efli, C. (2003). Do political factors matter for health care expenditure? A comparative study
of Swiss cantons. Journal of Public Policy, 23, 301–323.
Yamasaki, S., & Rihoux, B. (2009). A commented review of applications. In B. Rihoux & C. Ragin (Eds.),
Configurational comparative methods. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques
(pp. 123–146). London: Sage.
Zahariadis, N. (2007). The multiple streams framework: Structure, limitation, prospects. In P. A. Sabatier
(Ed.), Theories of the policy process (2nd ed., pp. 65–92). Boulder: Westview.
Zucker, L. G. (1983). Organizations as institutions. In S. B. Bachrach (Ed.), Research in the sociology of
organizations (pp. 1–42). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Policy Sci (2013) 46:1–21 21
123
